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Nineteenth-Century Catholic doctrine strongly opposed state schooling. We show that 
countries with larger shares of Catholics in 1900 (but without a Catholic state religion) tend to 
have larger shares of privately operated schools even today. We use this historical pattern as 
a natural experiment to estimate the causal effect of contemporary private competition on 
student achievement in cross-country student-level analyses. Our results show that larger 
shares of privately operated schools lead to better student achievement in mathematics, 
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1. Introduction 
The officials of the Catholic Church in the United States convened at the Third Plenary 
Council of Baltimore in 1884 against a backdrop of social conflict engendered by the advent of 
mass public education.  The ongoing push to establish “common schools” had produced a vast 
network of government-run schools which, while ostensibly non-sectarian, in fact embraced an 
approach to moral and religious instruction that Catholic leaders and many of their followers 
found objectionable.  Efforts to win equitable treatment for parochial schools with respect to 
government funding had provoked a backlash of constitutional provisions prohibiting aid to 
religious schools in most American states (Viteritti 1998).  Yet the Council only strengthened its 
commitment to establish a parallel system of private schools for American Catholics.  Taking 
heed of pronouncements on education from the Vatican, it reaffirmed the “absolute necessity and 
the obligation of pastors” to maintain distinctively Catholic schools and ordered that every parish 
open such a school within two years.  It also decreed that “parents must send their children to 
such schools unless the bishop should judge their reason for sending them elsewhere to be 
sufficient” (Herbermann 1912).  Their goal, the bishops famously declared, was no less than to 
see “every Catholic child in a Catholic school” (Reuben 2005). 
The American clerics were not unique in their resistance to the rise of state school systems.  
Since the early 19
th Century, official Catholic doctrine had emphasized the responsibility of local 
parishes to ensure that all Catholic children received a Catholic education.  Where the instruction 
offered in emerging state education systems was inconsistent with Catholic teachings, parishes 
worked to establish private schools and lobbied governments to provide financial support for 
their efforts.  As we will demonstrate below, even today countries that historically had larger 
shares of Catholics, but where Catholicism was not the official state religion, tend to have larger 
shares of privately operated schools. 
In this paper, we exploit this relationship between early resistance to state schooling and the 
current extent of private schooling to examine the effect of competition on student achievement 
across countries.  In particular, we draw upon contemporary variation in private school 
enrollment that is related to differences in the share of a country’s population that was Catholic 
at the end of the 19
th Century.  We argue that these historical differences provide a natural 
experiment that allows for the identification of causal effects of private school competition on 
the performance of national school systems.   2
The appropriate role of the private sector in the provision of schooling remains one of the 
most hotly contested governance issues among education researchers and policymakers 
worldwide.  Proposals for vouchers, tuition tax credits, and other mechanisms to expand access 
to private schooling are often justified on the grounds that enhanced competition from private 
schools will strengthen incentives for innovation and cost containment within the public sector, 
lifting student achievement system-wide (e.g., Friedman 1962; Neal 2002).  Critics of such 
policies, on the other hand, note that the educational benefits of competition are unproven and 
argue that a greater reliance on private schooling will lead to increased segregation of students 
along lines of ability, ethnicity, or class (e.g., Brighouse 2000; Ladd 2002). 
Although there is considerable international variation in the share of students attending 
private schools, existing evidence on the effects of private competition on student achievement 
across countries is limited, for obvious reasons.  In addition to the scarcity of comparable data on 
achievement and competition, the challenges researchers have faced include the possibility of 
unobserved differences in student characteristics correlated with private schooling and the 
potential endogeneity of private enrollment to public school quality.  If demand for private 
schooling reflects aspects of socioeconomic status that are not perfectly measured, then partial 
correlations between competition and public school quality will suffer from omitted variables 
bias.  Moreover, even well-controlled comparisons of countries with small and large private 
sectors will be biased to the extent that low-quality public schools increase demand for private 
schooling as a substitute. 
The identification strategy developed in this paper, which we implement using student-level 
data from 29 member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) that participated in the PISA 2003 study of student achievement, is intended to address 
these concerns.  We use the share of Catholics in 1900 (interacted with a variable indicating that 
Catholicism was not the state religion at that time) as an instrumental variable for a country’s 
contemporary share of private schools to identify the effect of competition from private schools 
on student achievement.  The historical nature of the instrument allows us to control directly for 
any effect that the current Catholic share has on student outcomes.  While our measure of the 
extent of private school competition is at the country level, we use the PISA 2003 student-level 
database to control for an unusually rich set of student and school background factors.   3
Our results indicate that the share of schools that are privately operated has an economically 
and statistically significant positive effect on student achievement in mathematics, science, and 
reading, even after controlling for the current levels of Catholics and for the share of funding that 
privately operated schools receive from the government.  In fact, the current share of Catholics is 
negatively related to student achievement in the second-stage model, suggesting that distinctive 
cultural features of traditionally Catholic countries are unlikely to be driving our results.  Our 
results further suggest that much of the benefit of private competition accrues to students in 
public schools.  Finally, we find that private competition reduces educational expenditure per 
student in the system, so that the better educational outcomes are obtained at lower cost. 
Most of the prior literature examining the effect of private school competition on student 
outcomes comes from the United States.  Studies exploiting differences in the size of the private 
sector related to contemporary differences in the density of Catholic population in order to make 
inferences about the effects of competition from private schools include Hoxby (1994), Dee 
(1998), Sander (1999), and Jepsen (2002).
1  A much smaller body of cross-country evidence 
addresses the effect of competition from private schools on system-wide performance at the 
national level, including Wößmann (2003, 2008) and Wößmann, Lüdemann, Schütz, and West 
(2007).
2  Using different datasets, each of these studies finds a strong positive correlation 
between the share of schools that are privately managed and the level of student achievement 
across countries.  To our knowledge, the current paper represents the first rigorous evidence that 
this relationship is, in fact, causal. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 documents Catholic doctrine towards state 
schooling in the 19
th Century and shows how it stimulated the emergence of private schools in 
several countries, despite the fact that predominantly non-Catholic countries were more 
educationally advanced.  Section 3 presents our estimation strategy and data.  Section 4 reports 
our results on the effect of private school competition on student achievement and educational 
expenditure.  Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
1 See Belfield and Levin (2002) for a review of the literature on this topic, as well as of related work on the 
effects of competition among public schools.  
2 Toma (1996) and Vandenberghe and Robin (2004) present evidence comparing achievement in public and 
private schools within several countries.   4
2.  Catholic Doctrine as an Historical Source of Private Schooling  
Our identification strategy exploits the fact that historical differences in the Catholic share of 
the population across countries led to persistent differences in the size of the private school 
sector.  This section provides historical evidence from several countries that reveals the 
mechanisms underlying this relationship.  We also show that, if anything, adherence to the 
Catholic faith has been negatively associated with educational and economic development, 
attenuating concerns that historical Catholic shares capture other features conducive to 
education. 




th Centuries saw the emergence and rapid institutionalization of a 
standard model of state-sponsored mass education across virtually all industrializing countries 
(Ramirez and Boli 1987).  Common characteristics of the education systems constructed during 
this period included the explicit recognition of a national interest in an educated population, 
compulsory schooling laws, the creation of a state education bureaucracy with authority over 
existing and new schools, and a growing share of schools operated directly by the state.  This 
model emerged first in Western Europe but by 1900 had spread throughout the industrialized 
world. 
Over the course of the 19
th Century, the Vatican authorities expressed increasing concern 
over the implications of these emerging state systems for the moral and religious training of 
Catholics.  For example, among the propositions included in the Syllabus Errorum, the list of 
commonly held beliefs condemned by Pope Pius IX in 1864, was the notion that “Catholics may 
approve of the system of educating youth unconnected with Catholic faith and the power of the 
Church.”  Thus, the pope declared it an error to conclude that Catholics could send their children 
to state-run schools outside the supervision of the Catholic Church.  Related claims also 
denounced in the Syllabus include those that “The entire government of public schools … may 
and ought to pertain to the civil power” and that “popular schools open to children of every class 
of the people … should be freed from all ecclesiastical authority, control and interference.” 
Catholic doctrine did not deny that the state had a legitimate interest in ensuring that all 
members of the public received an education of sufficient quality to maintain the public welfare.  
It therefore accepted compulsory attendance laws and acknowledged the right of the state to   5
monitor even Church-run schools in order to make certain that they complied with public health 
standards and did not teach politically subversive doctrines.  It also considered it appropriate for 
the government to collect taxes to support state schools, provided that such funds were shared 
with Catholic schools on an equitable basis (Herbermann 1912).   
This was rarely the case, however, and the Vatican repeatedly emphasized that the lack of 
equitable funding did not absolve parents of the responsibility to secure an appropriate (i.e., 
Catholic) education for their children.  Pope Leo XIII, in his 1884 encyclical On the Religious 
Question in France, wrote that the Church “has always expressly condemned mixed or neutral 
schools; over and over again she has warned parents to be ever on their guard in this most 
essential point.”  The Catholic Encyclopedia, published during the pontificate of Pope Pius X in 
1912 as a summary of official Catholic doctrine, stated that the “State monopoly of education has 
been considered by the Church to be nothing short of a tyrannical usurpation” (Herbermann 
1912, p. 558).
3 
2.2  Catholic Resistance to State Schooling in Specific Countries 
The Vatican’s formal pronouncements concerning education constituted binding mandates 
for Catholic officials at the national level, who in turn devoted considerable resources to the 
creation of privately operated Catholic schools.  In the United States, for example, the 1884 
meeting of the Third Plenary Council discussed above sparked the most rapid construction of 
parochial schools in the nation’s history.  By 1911, there were almost 5,000 parochial schools 
serving more than 1.27 million students nationwide (Herbermann 1912).  Although American 
Catholic schools never enrolled more than a small fraction of the national student population, as 
late as 1980 they accounted for almost 80 percent of enrollment in private elementary and 
secondary schools (Hoxby 1994). 
The late-19
th Century historical record of other countries is likewise filled with evidence of 
Catholic efforts to construct and maintain independent school systems in the face of growing 
                                                 
3 Interestingly, the language concerning parental obligations in Gravissimum Educationis, the Second Vatican 
Council’s 1965 decree on education, is far softer than that of the Church’s 19
th Century pronouncements: “The 
Council also reminds Catholic parents of the duty of entrusting their children to Catholic schools wherever and 
whenever it is possible and of supporting these schools to the best of their ability and of cooperating with them for 
the education of their children.”   6
state hostility.  In predominantly Catholic Belgium, for example, after the nation won its 
independence in 1830, the Church had either maintained its own schools with the support of 
public funds or exercised strong influence over the curriculum in municipal schools.  Yet the 
elite-dominated Liberal party, viewing state schooling “the primary instrument of popular 
enlightenment” (Glenn 1989, p. 84), in 1879 banned subsidies for Catholic schools and required 
all municipalities to establish public schools that would replace religious instruction with secular 
moral training.  Belgian Catholics responded by removing their children from the public schools 
and erecting their own, parallel system.  The share of Belgian elementary school students in 
Catholic schools rose from 13 percent in 1878 to 61 percent just two years later (Glenn 1989, p. 
85).  In 1884, the Catholic party regained a legislative majority and immediately returned control 
of schooling to the municipalities, allowing them to adopt or subsidize Catholic private schools 
within their jurisdiction.  
In the neighboring Netherlands, where Catholics made up only about one-third of the 
population, they allied with Calvinists who were equally dissatisfied with the non-
denominational instruction available in the state sector in order to secure government funding for 
privately operated religious schools.  In 1878, the Liberal party had adopted new staffing and 
physical requirements for all schools and established subsidies for municipal schools only.  Both 
changes threatened the continued existence of confessional schools and provoked an intense 
popular response.  By 1888, the Catholics and Calvinists had acquired a majority in the 
Parliament and the following year they adopted the same 30 percent national subsidy for 
confessional schools.  In 1917, the Dutch Constitution was amended to guarantee equal funding 
for any school meeting general enrollment and quality standards, without regard to whether the 
school was publicly or privately operated.  The share of Dutch students attending privately 
operated schools accordingly increased from 25 percent in 1880, to 38 percent in 1910, to 73 
percent in 1940 (Glenn 1988). 
The British government was relatively slow to become involved in the provision of 
education (Glenn 1989; West 2000).  After Local Education Authorities were established in 1882 
to fill up the gaps in the existing system, voluntary religious schools were gradually incorporated 
into the public system.  The exception within the United Kingdom as it existed in the late 19
th 
Century was Ireland, where the British government had in 1831 financed the creation of a system 
of nondenominational “National Schools” in an unsuccessful attempt to assimilate the   7
predominantly Catholic population.  Although many Irish Catholics initially responded 
favorably, their position hardened in the 1850s when the hierarchy decreed that “only schools 
under Catholic auspices could be regarded as satisfactory for the education of young Catholics” 
(Akenson 1970, p. 224).  In response, the British government made a series of accommodations, 
such as allowing the display of denominational symbols in the national schools (Farren 1995).  
The system that emerged once the Irish Republic gained independence in 1919 provided public 
funding for denominational schools subject to government regulation, but operated privately by 
religious congregations or independent governing boards (Glenn 1989). 
Protestant Christians in most countries were less resistant to state control of mass education.  
There are important exceptions, such as the Calvinists in the Netherlands, who rejected the 
lowest-common-denominator Protestantism available in state schools and joined forces with the 
Catholics in advocating for public subsidies for their own schools.  However, as a general rule, 
Protestant denominations lacked formal doctrines mandating that schooling be under their 
exclusive control and were more willing to pursue their educational goals within the framework 
created by the emerging state systems. 
The early German experience nicely illustrates the often divergent responses of Catholics 
and Protestants to the advent of state involvement in education.  As the Catholic Encyclopedia 
explains, “After the reformation in Germany the primary schools in Protestant provinces passed 
over to the control of the local civil authorities.  In Catholic communities the ecclesiastical 
authorities did not yield so readily to the aggression of the State” (Herberman 1912, p. 558).  
When the Prussian government mandated compulsory attendance at public schools in 1794, it 
allowed for these schools to be denominational and effectively operated by the Church.  Within 
this system, schools in Protestant areas again proved more accepting of steadily increasing 
government regulation: “There was little likelihood, during the 19
th Century, of the Protestant 
churches – committed to an alliance of Throne and Altar – taking an independent line in 
education” (Glenn 1989, p. 193).  In contrast, the government’s attempt to ban religious teaching 
orders from the schools in the 1870s provoked an intense response from Catholics that ensured 
that the German public schools would retain their denominational character. 
In short, in the late 19
th Century, the distinctive Catholic doctrine emphasizing the obligation 
of local parishes and parents to ensure that every Catholic child received a Catholic education 
spurred efforts to establish and maintain private schools in a variety of countries and, in some   8
contexts, to adopt policies benefiting private schools more generally.  Predictably, these efforts 
were most successful in countries where Catholics represented at least a substantial minority of 
the nation’s population.  Countries where Catholicism was the official state religion throughout 
this period are an obvious but important exception to this pattern, as Catholics in these nations 
did not need to create private schools in order to comply with their religion’s dictates.  Italy, 
Luxemburg, Portugal, and Spain, four of the nations in our dataset where Catholicism was the 
official state religion in 1900, all remain nominally Catholic today. 
2.3  Catholicism and Educational Progress 
The analysis below uses these historical patterns to isolate contemporary variation in the 
extent of private school competition across countries that is otherwise unrelated to contemporary 
student achievement.  In taking this approach, we assume that the density of Catholics in 1900 is 
not directly related to student achievement today, independent of any indirect effects through 
school competition.  Of course, this assumption is impossible to test definitively. 
It has been well documented, however, that Protestant Christians have traditionally placed a 
far greater emphasis than have Catholics on the value of education, in particular as a means to 
facilitate individual Bible reading (e.g., Green 1979; Rupp 1996; Becker and Wößmann 2008).  
In fact, across the 22 countries with a Christian majority for which literacy data are available, 
there is a strong negative association between Catholic population shares and literacy rates in 
1900 (r = -0.75, p-value = 0.0001).  The Catholic share was also negatively correlated with GDP 
per capita in 1900 (r = -0.54, p-value = 0.002, 29 countries).  But even after controlling for per-
capita GDP, the strong negative association between Catholicism and literacy persists.
4  Thus, to 
the extent that differences in cultural values related to religion bias our results, they should make 
us less likely to find beneficial effects of private school competition induced by Catholicism on 
educational outcomes. 
The historical prevalence of Catholicism could also have had other consequences, apart from 
a greater reliance on private schooling, that affect student achievement.  If so, the most likely 
pathways would seem to run through current GDP per capita or education spending per student.  
                                                 
4 These correlations include all countries with available data on literacy rates and GDP per capita, respectively, 
in which Catholics and Protestants together accounted for the majority of the population (see Becker and Wößmann 
2008 for data sources).  The same correlations hold within the sample of OECD countries used in our analyses.   9
We therefore control for both of these variables in all models relating Catholic shares, private 
schooling, and achievement.  We also examined whether the Catholic Church’s emphasis on 
subsidiarity, or the principle that social programs should be administered at the lowest possible 
level, may have shaped the development of national education systems.  Perhaps surprisingly, the 
Catholic population share in 1900 is not significantly correlated with the percentage of current 
school policy decisions (as documented in OECD 2004a) made at the national or school level (as 
opposed to regional or local levels) and is in fact negatively correlated with the percentage of 
decisions made at the local level.  Nor is the Catholic share in 1900 significantly correlated with 
either current public social expenditure or with current income inequality, two other possible 
indirect pathways of effects on educational outcomes.
5  Including any of these measures 
individually as additional control variables in the models presented below does not substantively 
affect our results concerning the effects of private school competition on student achievement. 
These patterns strongly support our assumption that Catholic population shares in 1900 are 
not positively related to current student achievement except for any indirect effect through their 
impact on private school competition.  If anything, the negative association of Catholicism with 
historical educational and economic development may downwardly bias estimated effects of 
private competition drawing on variation induced by historical Catholic shares.  Still, an 
important advantage of our use of historical variation in Catholic population shares is that we can 
address lingering concerns about the possibility that Catholicism has a direct influence on 
student achievement by controlling for contemporary differences in the share of Catholic 
adherents across countries.   
3.  Estimation Strategy and Data  
This section discusses the formal specification of our cross-country instrumental variables 
model of the effects of private school competition on student achievement.  It also introduces the 
PISA 2003 international student achievement database and other international data that we use to 
implement this model. 
                                                 
5 Data on public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP in 2003 and on the distribution of household 
disposable income among individuals measured by Gini coefficients in 2000 are available in OECD (2008).   10
3.1  The Econometric Model 
Most existing international evidence on the relationship between private school competition 
and student achievement (e.g., Wößmann 2003, 2008; Wößmann, Lüdemann, Schütz, and West 
2007) is based on cross-country education production functions of the following form: 
  isc isc sc c c isc P T ε β β β β α + + + + + = 3 2 1 0 1 X X X  (1) 
where Tics is the test score of student i in school s in country c.  The country-level variable Pc, 
which represents the share of students attending privately operated schools, measures the extent 
of competition from private schools within each national school system.  X c is a vector of 
country-level control variables, Xsc is a vector of variables measuring school location and 
resources,  and X isc is a vector of student-level variables measuring student and family 
background characteristics.  Finally, εics is a zero-mean error term adjusted to allow for the 
clustering of observations by country. 
We begin our analysis with this same approach, taking the specification of the control model 
from Wößmann, Lüdemann, Schütz, and West (2007).  The vector of student and family 
background characteristics consists of 31 variables, including such indicators as the student’s 
gender and age, attendance of institutions of pre-primary education, immigration status, family 
status, and parental occupation and work status.  The vector of variables measuring school 
location and resources comprises 9 variables such as class size, availability of materials, 
instruction time, teacher education, and city size.  The vector of country-level variables includes 
per-capita GDP of the country, average expenditure per student, external exit exams, and an 
indicator for whether the country had a Communist government in 1970.  Appendix Table A.1 
provides a complete list of all control variables included in our models. 
There are at least two potential concerns with interpreting ordinary least squares estimates of 
β0 as the causal effect of private school competition on educational achievement.  Most within-
country analyses of competitive effects (e.g., Hoxby 1994; Dee 1998) have emphasized the likely 
endogeneity of private school enrollment with respect to public school quality.  All else equal, 
low-quality public schools should increase demand for private alternatives, biasing correlational 
studies against finding beneficial effects of competition.  An equally important concern, 
especially in the context of cross-country studies, is the possibility of omitted variables 
correlated with both the extent of private schooling and student achievement.  These omitted   11
variables could include factors that increase the demand for private schooling or institutional or 
policy factors that affect its supply.  Unlike the potential bias due to endogeneity, the expected 
direction of any bias resulting from omitted variables is unclear. 
Our analysis addresses these concerns by using the share of each country’s population that 
was Catholic in 1900 (interacted with an indicator for whether Catholicism was not the official 
state religion, so that observations from officially Catholic countries have a value of zero) as an 
instrument for our measure of contemporary private school competition.  As suggested by the 
historical evidence presented above, the Catholic population share in 1900 is highly predictive of 
the extent of private schooling in 2003 – at least in those countries where Catholics could not 
rely on the fact that Catholicism was the official state religion in order to exercise control over 
the school system.  And we argued that historical differences in Catholicism should not 
otherwise be related to contemporary student achievement, except perhaps in a negative way. 
We implement this cross-country instrumental variables estimation strategy using two-stage 
least squares, where Pc in the second-stage model (1) is the predicted value of the following first-
stage model: 
  ics isc sc c c c Cath P ε β β β δ α + + + + + = 6 5 4
1900
1 X X X  (2) 
which regresses the share of privately operated schools in 2003 (Pc) on Cath
1900, a measure of the 
share of the population of countries without Catholic state religion that was Catholic in 1900, and 
the other control variables. 
As discussed above, one advantage of our use of historical data on Catholicism is that we 
can address any lingering concerns about the exogeneity of our instrument by controlling for the 
share of each country’s population that is Catholic in 2000.  Therefore, in some specifications we 
add this information as an additional country-level variable in equations (1) and (2), effectively 
identifying based on changes in Catholic population shares over the course of the 20
th Century. 
Our use of information on the religious composition, and in particular our use of the 
Catholic share of the population, in order to isolate the causal effect of private school 
competition on student achievement is closely related to the identification strategies used in a 
series of papers examining the effects of private school competition in the United States.  Hoxby 
(1994), Dee (1998), Sander (1999), and Jepsen (2002) all use some measure of the contemporary 
variation in the population density of Catholics in the United States as an instrument for private 
school competition in estimating effects on the quality of public schools, arguing that a greater   12
concentration of Catholics reduces the cost of establishing private schools.
6  Hoxby (1996), in 
the approach most similar in spirit to ours, uses the change between 1950 and 1980 in Catholic 
population shares as an instrument for the level of subsidies for private schooling. 
We extend this literature by using an historical instrument that dates as far back as 1900.
7  
That is, rather than using differences in religious adherence within the current population, we 
isolate variation in private school enrollment emanating from the historical implementation of 
traditional Catholic doctrine.
8  Not only does our use of data on religious composition from 1900 
increase confidence in the instrument’s validity, it also allows us to control directly for the 
effects of contemporary religious composition when estimating the effects of private 
competition.  In addition, the use of international data allows us to consider much wider variation 
in the extent of competition from private schooling than exists in the United States. 
3.2  International Data on Student Achievement and Religious Adherence 
The 2003 round of the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) was 
conducted in 41 developed and emerging countries, 30 of which are members of the OECD.
9  
PISA 2003 assessed the mathematical, scientific, and reading literacy of the student population 
in each participating country.
10  As in the first PISA study conducted in 2000, the target 
population was the 15-year-old students in each country, regardless of the grade they currently 
                                                 
6 Gallego (2004) and Card, Dooley, and Payne (2007) use similar identification strategies in Chile and Canada, 
respectively.  In related work, Evans and Schwab (1995), Neal (1997), Sander (1996), and Jepsen (2003) use similar 
indicators of Catholicism as instruments to estimate the relative effectiveness of Catholic and public schools.   
Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) present evidence that these instruments may not be valid in that setting. 
7 The use of historical instruments to obtain exogenous variation in contemporary institutions is in a similar 
spirit as Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). 
8 Cohen-Zada (forthcoming) argues that the Catholic share of the population in 1890 (and its squared term) 
serve as a useful instrument for contemporary private school competition in the United States. 
9 For detailed information on the PISA study and its database, see OECD (2004b, 2005) and the PISA 
homepage at http://www.pisa.oecd.org. 
10 The term “literacy” signifies that the study measured not only the knowledge of the students in each of the 
three domains, for example based on national curricula, but also their ability to use the acquired knowledge to meet 
real-life challenges.   13
attended.  Thus, in most participating countries, the target population consists of individuals 
nearing the last stages of compulsory schooling. 
Importantly for our use of these data to make cross-country comparisons, the PISA sampling 
procedure ensured that a representative sample of the target population was tested in each 
country.
11  According to the study protocol, a minimum of 150 schools were required to be 
sampled and a minimum of 4,500 students to be assessed in each country.  The final sample size 
varied considerably between participating countries, ranging from 3,350 students in 129 schools 
in Iceland to 29,983 students in 1,124 schools in Mexico.  We weight all regressions by sampling 
probabilities to obtain consistent student population estimates within each country.  Across 
countries, each country carries the same aggregate weight.
12 
The main focus of the PISA 2003 study was on mathematical literacy, with about 70 percent 
of testing time devoted to this domain.  The remainder of the testing focused on science and 
reading literacy.  The test items were presented to the students in the form of booklets that varied 
in the composition of clusters of test items.  Item response theory scaling was then used to 
calculate proficiency scores in each of the tested domains for each participating student.  These 
scores were mapped on a scale with an international mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100 
test-score points across OECD countries.  
PISA 2003 not only provides achievement data for representative samples of students in the 
participating countries but also a rich array of background information on each student and on 
the student’s school.  In separate background questionnaires, students were asked to provide 
information on their personal characteristics and family backgrounds, and school principals 
provided information on their schools’ resource endowments and institutional settings. 
                                                 
11 Most countries employed a two-stage sampling technique.  The first stage drew a (usually stratified) random 
sample of schools in which 15-year-old students were enrolled.  In most countries, the probability of the schools to 
be selected was proportional to their size as measured by the estimated numbers of 15-year-old students enrolled in 
the school.  The second stage randomly sampled 35 of the 15-year-old students in each of these schools, with each 
15-year-old student in a school having equal selection probability. 
12 This weighting scheme ensures that each system-level observation of the extent of private competition 
contributes equally to the estimation.  Weighting countries by student population sizes would lead to the results 
being dominated by a few large countries, especially the United States (with 28 percent of 15-year-old students 
across the 29 countries), Japan (11 percent), and Mexico (9 percent).  Even so, our main results are robust to 
weighting by population sizes, although the instrument is weaker if (and only if) the United States is included.   14
In particular, the PISA database provides an indicator for whether each student’s school is 
privately operated (as well as the share of its funding that it receives from government sources).  
School principals reported whether their school is a private school, defined as being managed 
directly or indirectly by a non-government organization (e.g., a church, trade union, business, or 
other private institution), or a public school, defined as being managed directly or indirectly by a 
public education authority, government agency, or governing board appointed by government or 
elected by public franchise.  In our analyses, we use this variable aggregated to the country level 
as our measure of private school competition. 
Combining the available data, we constructed a dataset containing about 220,000 students in 
29 of the 30 OECD countries.
13  The dataset combines students’ test scores in mathematics, 
science, and reading with students’ characteristics, family-background data, and school 
characteristics.  We imputed missing observations on the questionnaire items using the 
conditional mean imputation method (cf. Little and Rubin 1987) described in Wößmann, 
Lüdemann, Schütz, and West (2007, Appendix B.3).  To ensure that our results are not biased by 
the inclusion of imputed observations, all regression specifications include separate dummy 
variables identifying observations with imputed data on each variable as well as interactions 
between these dummies and the relevant variable. 
We supplement this rich student- and school-level database from PISA 2003 with additional 
country-level data.  Crucially for our identification strategy, data on the Catholic population 
share of each country in 1900 and 2000 and indicators of countries with state religions are 
available from Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001).
14  We use Barro and McCleary (2005) to 
identify the countries in our sample with Communist regimes in 1970.  Additional country-level 
indicators on GDP per capita in 2003, cumulative educational expenditure per student between 
age 6 and 15 in 2002, and the existence of curriculum-based external exit exams come from 
several international statistical sources (see Wößmann, Lüdemann, Schütz, and West 2007).  
                                                 
13 France had to be dropped from the sample because no school-level background information was provided.  
14 We edit the Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001) data on state religion for Austria (which was 92 percent 
Catholic in 1900), coding it as an officially Catholic country.  Although the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 
guaranteed religious liberty, the Catholic Habsburg monarchy maintained a Catholic school system within the 
boundaries of what is now Austria (Jelavich 1987).  All results reported in this paper are robust to the exclusion of 
Austria from the analysis.      15
Appendix Table A.1 reports international descriptive statistics for all the variables employed 
in our analyses.  Table A.2 presents country means of selected variables for each participating 
country. 
4. Results 
This section presents our estimation results on the effect of private school competition on 
student achievement, followed by robustness specifications and results on effects on educational 
spending. 
4.1  The Effects of Private School Competition on Student Achievement 
As a point of comparison for the results of our preferred specifications, Table 1 reports the 
coefficient on the share of PISA 2003 students in a country who attend privately operated 
schools in a least squares estimation of equation (1).  There is a strong and statistically 
significant positive association between the private school share and student achievement on the 
PISA 2003 math test, even after controlling for the host of student, family, and school 
background factors.  The estimate is hardly affected by the inclusion of Catholic share in 2000 as 
a control variable, which enters the model negatively but statistically insignificantly.  The 
average share of funding that private schools receive from government sources, when added to 
the model as an additional country-level control variable, captures some part of the effect of the 
private school share.
15  As is evident from columns (4)-(6) of Table 1, these results hardly 
change when we restrict the sample to only those countries which are predominantly Christian, 
defined as having a share of Christians (from different denominations) in 1900 of more than 85 
percent.  This eliminates Japan (1 percent Christian share), Korea (1 percent), and Turkey (22 
percent), countries for which historical Catholic shares are unlikely to be relevant for 
contemporary private school enrollment. 
As discussed above, these least squares estimates may be biased by endogeneity and omitted 
variables.  We therefore turn to the instrumental variable (IV) strategy proposed above, which 
                                                 
15 The variable “government funding share in private schools” is calculated as the average share of funding that 
the private schools tested in PISA 2003 report that they receive from government sources in each country.  Two 
countries (Australia and Austria) drop out of this specification because their schools did not provide information on 
the share of funding received from government sources.   16
uses only that part of the contemporary international variation in the share of enrollment in 
privately operated schools that can be explained by historical differences in the Catholic 
population share. 
We first show that there is in fact a strong association between the private school share 
today and the instrument.  This is evident from the second panel of Table 2, which presents 
estimates of equation (2), the first stage of our IV specification.  (Results for all control variables 
in both the first- and second-stage models are reported in Appendix Table A.1.)  The results 
confirm that the share of students in a country who attend privately operated schools in 2003 is 
highly correlated with our instrument, the share of Catholics in the population in 1900 interacted 
with an indicator that Catholicism was not the official state religion.  In the basic model 
presented in column (1), a ten percentage point increase in the Catholic share in 1900 in 
countries where Catholicism was not the state religion is associated with a 4.7 percent increase in 
the share of students enrolled in privately operated schools in 2003.  The F-statistic of the 
instrument in the first-stage regression is 13.4, suggesting that our model should not suffer from 
weak instrument problems (cf. Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002).  The first-stage result supports 
our basic reasoning above that – as long as Catholics could not be sure that the emerging public 
school systems of the 19
th Century would provide education in line with demands of the Catholic 
Church – they tended to resist state-provided schools and establish their own private Catholic 
schools.  The consequences of the historical differences in denominational shares persist to the 
present day. 
Note that the significant first-stage association holds even when the share of Catholics in the 
current population is added to the model in column (2).  While the contemporary Catholic share 
is also significantly associated with the contemporary private school share, the predictive power 
of the historical Catholic share for our IV strategy is only modestly reduced.  When the share of 
funding that private schools receive from government sources is added as a covariate in column 
(3), the statistical significance of the relationship increases.  While more government funding for 
privately operated schools does increase the share of students attending privately operated 
schools, this effect operates independently of the association between the historical Catholic 
share and the current private school share. 
Figure 1 displays the first-stage relationship reported in column (1) of Table 2 as an added-
variable plot aggregated to the country level, the level of variation relevant for our cross-country   17
identification strategy.
16  Though the positive association is evident across the entire sample, 
three countries – Belgium, Ireland, and the Netherlands – stand out as particularly important in 
terms of our identifying association.  Each had relatively large shares of Catholics in 1900 
without Catholicism being the official state religion, and they all built up large private Catholic 
school systems that have repercussions today.
17 
Turning to the second stage of our IV estimation, the first panel of Table 2 reports the 
central result of our paper.  The estimates show how student achievement in mathematics 
depends on the extent of competition from privately operated schools in a system.  The IV 
estimate of the effect of the private school enrollment share is positive and statistically 
significant: A ten percentage point increase in the share of national enrollment in private schools 
attributable to an historically larger share of Catholics improves math test scores by 9.1 percent 
of a standard deviation.  Given a cross-country standard deviation of the private school share of 
0.21, this result implies that a one standard deviation increase in private school enrollment 
increases student achievement in math by 19 percent of an international standard deviation in test 
scores.  Due to the clustering of the standard errors at the country level and the thus very limited 
degrees of statistical freedom at the country level (effectively dealing with 29 independent 
observations), the statistical precision of the estimate is not very high.  The 95 percent 
confidence interval bounds the effect of a ten percentage point increase in the private school 
share between 3.9 and 14.2 percent of a standard deviation in test scores.  Still, the estimate 
provides a high degree of confidence that the effect is larger than zero.  The basic result is that 
students in countries whose larger shares of Catholic population in 1900 induced them to have 
larger shares of privately operated schools today perform significantly better on the PISA 2003 
math test. 
                                                 
16 Added-variable plots show the association between two variables after eliminating the influence of other 
control variables.  Each of the two variables is first regressed on the other controls, and only the residuals from these 
regressions are used in the graph.  The procedure is numerically equivalent to including the other controls in a 
multivariate regression of private school enrollment share in 2003 on historical Catholic share. 
17 Although the first stage loses statistical significance when Belgium, Ireland, and the Netherlands are all 
excluded from the sample, the least squares estimate on private school share in the second-stage model is actually 
significantly positive even without these three countries.   18
Note that the increase in the estimate from the least squares to the IV specification is 
consistent with a downward bias of the least squares estimates due to endogeneity.  According to 
this logic, the demand for private alternatives is higher and thus private schools are more likely 
to be established where the quality of public schools is low. 
The second column of Table 2 adds the share of Catholics in the current population as an 
additional covariate.
18  In this specification, identification is driven solely by historical 
differences in the Catholic share that are not correlated with current differences in the Catholic 
share – in other words, the change in the Catholic share.
19  Note that – in line with the historical 
evidence presented above – adherence to the Catholic faith among the current population is 
actually negatively associated with student achievement, with an estimate just shy of statistical 
significance.  Together with the fact that the IV estimate of the private school share remains 
strongly significant in this specification, this increases confidence that our IV estimates indeed 
capture effects of private competition, rather than effects related to religious adherence.  In fact, 
the coefficient estimate on the private school share increases relative to the specification that 
does not control for current Catholic adherence, which may suggest that the latter was negatively 
biased because the historical Catholic share captures a slight negative direct effect of Catholic 
adherence on student achievement.  This only strengthens the result of a positive effect of private 
school competition.  The point estimate of an increase of 12.2 standard deviations in test scores 
for each ten percentage point increase in the private school share suggests that the true effect 
may be close to the upper bound of the confidence interval of the estimate discussed above. 
As is evident from the first stage of column (3) in Table 2, the share of students attending 
privately operated schools is also strongly related to the extent to which governments take over 
                                                 
18 Results are qualitatively unaffected if we use the Catholic share in 2000 interacted with an indicator that 
Catholicism is not a state religion in 2000 as an alternative control.  Also, when added as a control in addition to the 
Catholic share in 2000, an indicator for Catholic state religion in 2000 does not enter significantly in either the first 
or second stage of the model and does not change our basic results. 
19 The major source of changes in Catholic shares appears to be secularization, which has disproportionately 
affected countries that were predominantly Catholic historically.  This means that identification in this specification 
comes primarily from those countries that had higher Catholic shares in 1900 than they have today, which is the type 
of variation emphasized by our identification strategy.  Note that our main results are robust to excluding the Czech 
Republic, Poland, and the Slovak Republic, three countries with large changes in the Catholic share that may reflect 
in part changes in borders (as well as the influence of Communism).   19
part of the costs of privately operated schools.  This raises the question of whether the increased 
private competition stemming from differences in historical Catholic population shares depends 
on the latter’s impact on state funding rules for privately operated schools.  As the second-stage 
results reveal, controlling for the average share of funding that private schools receive from the 
government hardly affects the estimate on the private school enrollment share, suggesting that 
the estimates reported in the first two columns reflect competitive effects stemming from the 
private operation of schools and not from differences in funding policies. 
The estimates reported in columns (4)-(6) of Table 2 show the results are qualitatively 
unaffected when countries with low shares of Christians are dropped from the sample. 
4.2  Results for Other Subjects and Robustness Checks 
Table 3 reports the equivalents of the math specifications (1)-(3) of Table 2 for student 
achievement in science and reading.  While the estimates of the effect of the private school share 
on student achievement are somewhat smaller in science and reading than in math, they remain 
significantly positive.  The point estimate from the basic model implies that a change in the 
historical Catholic population share that translates into a ten percentage point increase in the 
share of students attending privately operated schools today generates an increase of about 5.5 
percent of a standard deviation in both science and reading.  The specifications including current 
Catholic population shares show that this variable is less negatively related to science and 
especially reading achievement than it is to math achievement. 
Table 4 reports additional analyses testing the math results based on the specification 
presented in the first column of Table 2 for robustness in different samples.
20  The first column 
excludes the countries where Catholicism was the official state religion in 1900.  This group 
includes Austria, Italy, Luxemburg, Portugal, and Spain.  Among the remaining countries, the 
instrument is simply the Catholic population share in 1900 (without an interaction).  The first-
stage association grows even stronger using this sample, and the second-stage result is 
confirmed. 
Column (2) drops two countries – Mexico and Turkey – with particularly low levels of GDP 
per capita.  These countries also stand out by having an average socioeconomic status that is a 
                                                 
20 All the specifications reported in Table 4 are also robust to including controls for Catholic share in 2000 and 
government funding share in private schools.   20
full standard deviation below the OECD average (as measured by the PISA index of economic, 
social and cultural status; see Appendix Table A.2).  The estimates show that both the first-stage 
and the second-stage results become slightly stronger when these two countries are excluded 
from the sample. 
Column (3) of Table 4 adds dummies for world regions (Europe, East Asia, North America, 
and Oceania) to the model.  This hardly affects the model at all.  Likewise, restricting the 
analysis to European countries, which have a common Christian heritage divided among various 
denominations, hardly affects the results (column (4)).  We also confirmed that results are robust 
to dropping each individual country from the analysis one at a time.
21 
Finally, column (5) of Table 4 drops all students attending a privately operated school from 
the sample in each country, thus estimating the effect of competition from privately operated 
schools on the performance of students in the public sector.  These results are somewhat more 
difficult to interpret, as they combine competitive effects with the consequences of any cross-
sector sorting of students with respect to achievement.  To the extent that private schools 
disproportionately attract students with a propensity for higher achievement, the estimated 
effects of competition will be biased downward by selection.  Nonetheless, the results suggest 
that public school students profit nearly as much from the increased private school competition 
as students who themselves attend private schools.  While the point estimate is somewhat smaller 
than the analogous result for the full sample reported in column (1) of Table 2, the two estimates 
are not statistically distinguishable.  It becomes clear that a lot of the increased performance of 
school systems that are exposed to increased private school competition accrues to students who 
attend public schools. 
4.3  The Effects of Private School Competition on Educational Spending 
The analysis so far has been limited to the outcome side of the educational process, 
estimating the effect of private school competition on students’ educational achievement.  In 
doing so, we have controlled for possible effects of differences in educational inputs such as 
class sizes, availability of materials, and aggregate expenditure per student in the country.  This 
section turns to the question of whether private school competition also affects the input side of 
                                                 
21 Although the effect of private competition becomes only marginally significant when Belgium is discarded 
(primarily because the instrument loses some of its predictive power), the point estimate is essentially unchanged.    21
the educational process, again using historical Catholicism as an instrument to obtain exogenous 
variation in the current private school share.  Specifically, we take the country-level measure of 
cumulative educational expenditure per student up to age 15 (measured in purchasing power 
parities) as our dependent variable and drop all school-level input measures from our set of 
explanatory variables. 
As the estimates reported in Table 5 reveal, the first-stage results are hardly affected by 
dropping the input measures from the model.  The second-stage results show that private school 
competition – in addition to raising student achievement – significantly reduces the average 
spending level of the system.  Changes in historical shares of Catholics in the population that are 
associated with a ten percentage point increase in the private school share today lead to a $3,209 
reduction in cumulative spending per student, or 5.6 percent of the average OECD spending level 
(of $56,947). 
Competition from private schools therefore appears to increase educational productivity not 
only by improving student achievement, but also by decreasing the total inputs devoted to 
education.  The productivity of the school system measured as the ratio between output and input 
increases by even more than is suggested by looking at educational outcomes alone. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has exploited international variation in the current size of the private school 
sector stemming from historical differences in the size of the Catholic population.  Catholic 
doctrine in the 19
th Century, by resisting the emergence of state school systems and demanding 
that every Catholic child receive a comprehensive Catholic education, spurred the creation of 
private Catholic schools in several countries.  Although the distinctive Catholic teachings on 
private education have grown less salient over time, their consequences for the development of 
national education systems remain evident today.  We show that countries with larger shares of 
Catholics but without an official Catholic state religion in 1900 have significantly larger shares 
of privately operated schools in 2003, even after controlling for contemporary differences in 
Catholic population shares.  Our estimates suggest that larger historical Catholic shares that 
translate into a ten percentage point larger private school sector today increase average student 
achievement on the PISA 2003 math test by at least 9 percent of an international standard 
deviation.  Science and reading achievement increase by at least 5 percent of a standard   22
deviation.  This is despite the fact that contemporary Catholic shares, which we controlled for in 
some specifications, are negatively related to student achievement.  A large part of the overall 
achievement improvement in systems with large private school competition appears to accrue to 
students attending public schools.  The natural-experiment framework we develop supports a 
causal interpretation of these associations, suggesting that competition from privately operated 
schools leads to better student achievement system-wide. 
Not only do school systems with more extensive private sector competition improve 
educational outcomes, they also do so at lower costs.  Our results show that larger Catholic 
population shares in 1900 that translate into a ten percentage point larger contemporary share of 
private schools reduce educational expenditure per student by about 5 percent of the average 
OECD spending.  By decreasing inputs at the same time as increasing outcomes, private 
competition appears to provide a significant boost to the productivity of the school system. 
Our results reveal that historical “coincidences” – namely that Catholic resistance to state 
education in the 19
th Century induced larger shares of privately operated schools even today, 
when such resistance no longer exists in most countries – can have quite unexpected and very 
long-term consequences.  Even though Catholics have historically placed less emphasis on 
education than, for example, Protestants and Jews (cf. Becker and Wößmann 2008; Botticini and 
Eckstein 2007), their opposition to state education in many contexts engendered private school 
competition that ultimately spurred student achievement.   23
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Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics and Full Results of Basic Model 
 Descriptive  statistics Basic  model 
   Mean  Std. dev.
First stage 
(dep. var.: private 
school share) 
Second stage  
(dep. var.:  
PISA math score) 
       Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.
PISA 2003 math score  499.626  100.365         
PISA 2003 science score  499.239  105.252         
PISA 2003 reading score  494.137  100.457         
Private school share  0.174  0.215      90.625
***  (25.127)
Catholic share in 1900 (no state religion)  0.442 0.404  0.477
*** (0.130)     
Catholic share in 2000  0.404  0.354         
Government funding share in private schools  0.538  0.344         
Student characteristics            
Female 0.496    -0.005 (0.004)  -16.896
*** (1.624) 
Age (years)  15.780  0.291  -0.012 (0.023)  21.825
***  (4.022) 
Preprimary education (more than 1 year)  0.680    0.052
** (0.020)  3.651  (3.270) 
School starting age  6.032  0.863  0.012  (0.016)  -1.875  (2.154) 
Grade repetition in primary school  0.074    0.068
* (0.039)  -40.908
*** (6.331) 
Grade repetition in secondary school  0.062    0.096
** (0.038)  -38.981
*** (7.402) 
Grade            
     7
th grade 0.006    -0.081 (0.071)  -35.578
*** (11.397)
     8
th grade 0.047    -0.093
* (0.055)  -16.891  (10.361)
     9
th grade 0.359    -0.016 (0.034)  -6.614  (6.295) 
     10
th grade 0.526           
     11
th grade 0.061    -0.045 (0.050)  -3.269  (7.215) 
     12
th grade  0.001    -0.132
** (0.063)  15.787  (10.051)
Immigration background            
     Native student  0.916           
     First generation students  0.037    -0.025 (0.021)  -6.506  (3.990) 
     Non-native students  0.047    -0.026 (0.021)  -7.763  (4.956) 
Language spoken at home             
     Test language or other official national language 0.921           
     Other national dialect or language  0.032    0.026  (0.081)  -26.037
*** (7.189) 
     None of above  0.046    -0.015 (0.014)  -7.118
**  (3.455) 
Family background            
Living with            
     No parent  0.018           
     Single mother or father  0.201    -0.015 (0.015)  22.936
***  (3.827) 
     Patchwork family  0.064    -0.018 (0.020)  27.358
***  (4.638) 
     Both parents  0.717    0.006  (0.018)  30.526
***  (3.700) 
Parents’ working status            
     Both full-time  0.391    -0.017
* (0.010)  9.144
***  (2.483) 
     One full-time, one half-time  0.179    -0.004 (0.017)  14.433
***  (2.780) 
     At least one full time  0.293    0.002  (0.008)  5.946
***  (2.096) 
     At least one half time  0.065    -0.005 (0.011)  -3.913  (2.936) 
     Other (less than one half but not both missing)  0.071            
Parents’ job            
     Blue collar low skilled  0.095          
     Blue collar high skilled  0.139   0.012
* (0.006)  1.380  (1.963) 
     White collar low skilled  0.234   0.012  (0.008)  3.996
**  (1.498) 
     White collar high skilled  0.533    0.012  (0.011)  8.572
***  (2.921) 
Books at home            
     1-10 books  0.093           
     11-25 books  0.142    0.006  (0.004)  5.831
***  (1.817) 
     26-100 books  0.310    0.012  (0.009)  23.926
***  (2.030) 
     101-200 books  0.198    0.016  (0.012)  33.316
***  (2.261) 
     201-500 books  0.159    0.016  (0.013)  50.579
***  (2.684) 
     More than 500 books  0.098    0.017  (0.014)  51.894
***  (3.338) 
Index of economic, social & cultural status (ESCS) -0.001  1.007  -0.018
** (0.007)  20.109
***  (2.036) 
School location and resources            
School’s community location            
     Village or rural area (<3,000)   0.108           
     Town (3,000-100,000)  0.568    0.051
* (0.019)  3.047  (3.132) 
     City (100,000-1,000,000)   0.213    0.066
*** (0.023)  9.535
**  (3.543) 
     Large city with > 1 million people   0.112    0.118
*** (0.030)  1.424  (5.806) 
Class size (mathematics)  23.206  7.621  0.001  (0.001)  1.363
***  (0.319) 
Shortage of instructional materials            
     Not at all  0.380    0.055
*** (0.019)  3.545  (2.170) 
     Strongly  0.070    -0.019 (0.019)  -6.961
*  (3.545) 
Instruction time (mathematics, minutes per week)  197.874  93.651  -0.000 (0.000)  0.028
*  (0.016) 
Teacher education (share at school)            
     Fully certified teachers 0.908   0.061  (0.041)  7.180  (8.287) 
     Tertiary degree in pedagogy  0.668    -0.041 (0.070)  5.774  (8.001) 
Country-level measures            
GDP per capita (1,000 $)  23.009  8.926  -0.000 (0.009)  -1.834  (1.481) 
Educational expenditure per student (1,000 $)  56.947  25.507  -0.001 (0.004)  1.462
**  (0.603) 
External exit exams (in math)  0.650  0.450  0.147  (0.094)  15.196  (9.289) 
Communist background  0.144  0.344  -0.515
*** (0.123)  20.255  (13.632)
Observations (students)      219,794   219,794   
Clustering units (countries)       29    29   
R
2       0.510    0.373   
  Descriptive statistics: Sample: OECD countries (without imputed observations).  Mean: international mean 
(weighted by sampling probabilities).  Std. dev.: international standard deviation (only for continuous variables). 
Basic model: Full results of the specification reported in the first column of Table 2.  Two-stage least squares 
regression weighted by students’ sampling probability.  Regression controls for imputation dummies and interaction 
terms between imputation dummies and the variables. “Catholic share in 1900 (no state religion)” refers to the share 
of Catholics in the population in 1900 interacted with an indicator of whether Catholicism was the state religion.  
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level in parentheses.  Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 
5 percent, 
* 10 percent.   
 Table A.2: Country Means of Selected Variables 
   Test scores  GDP   Socio-  Private  Government funding  Catholic  Catholic  Catholic 
  Math  Science  Reading  per   economic  school   Private   Public  share  share  state  religion
        capita  status   share  schools  schools  in 1900  in 2000  in 1900 
Australia  524.08 525.38 525.67 27,872  0.23  0.38  -  -  0.223  0.260  0 
Austria  505.10 490.98 490.91 27,567  0.05  0.08  -  -  0.916  0.755  1 
Belgium  529.09 508.20 506.99 25,262  0.14  0.69  0.851  0.966  0.974  0.809  0 
Canada  532.64 518.00 527.65 27,845  0.44  0.07  0.540  0.940  0.399  0.391  0 
Czech Republic  516.06  522.18 488.04 14,642  0.15 0.07  0.634 0.969  0.862 0.404  0 
Denmark  513.74 474.41 491.21 27,970  0.20  0.22  0.756  0.981  0.002  0.006  0 
Finland  544.17 547.53 542.90 23,786  0.24  0.07  0.979  0.999  0.000  0.001  0 
Germany  503.08 502.62 491.70 25,189  0.15  0.08  0.782  0.978  0.357  0.335  0 
Greece 444.55  480.66  471.58 15,787  -0.16  0.04  0.000 0.901  0.013 0.004  0 
Hungary  490.34 504.02 481.87 13,016  -0.07  0.11  0.779  0.927  0.606  0.609  0 
Iceland  514.71 494.50 491.73 26,352  0.69  0.00  0.897  0.977  0.000  0.010  0 
Ireland  503.48 506.20 515.82 28,247  -0.08  0.61  0.448  0.999  0.887  0.847  0 
Italy  465.77 486.30 474.94 22,924  -0.11  0.05  0.135  0.746  0.996  0.798  1 
Japan  533.64 548.14 499.04 24,036  -0.08  0.27  0.327  0.895  0.001  0.004  0 
Korea  541.63 538.46 534.71 17,595  -0.10  0.56  0.552  0.475  0.005  0.069  0 
Luxembourg  493.28 482.81 478.58 49,261  0.19  0.14  0.885  0.988  0.966  0.902  1 
Mexico 384.86  403.53  399.53  7,939  -1.14  0.16  0.008  0.453  0.908  0.900  0 
Netherlands  538.06 524.91 513.96 26,154  0.08  0.77  0.956  0.954  0.351  0.345  0 
New  Zealand  524.08 521.81 521.99 22,197  0.21  0.05  0.150  0.808  0.135  0.128  0 
Norway  495.35 484.93 499.68 34,013  0.61  0.01  0.883  0.997  0.001  0.010  0 
Poland  490.10 497.86 496.48 9,2171  -0.21  0.01  0.353  0.964  0.771  0.922  0 
Portugal  466.14 468.46 477.76 17,333  -0.64  0.06  0.643  0.853  0.998  0.887  1 
Slovak  Republic  498.63 494.67 469.24 10,943  -0.09  0.12  0.935  0.921  0.847  0.679  0 
Spain  485.57 487.48 481.68 20,642  -0.30  0.38  0.670  0.958  1.000  0.917  1 
Sweden  509.59 506.33 514.32 26,138  0.25  0.04  0.989  0.998  0.000  0.019  0 
Switzerland  526.09 513.11 498.61 28,792  -0.06  0.06  0.222  0.989  0.399  0.429  0 
Turkey 423.80  434.64  441.68  5,634  -0.99  0.03  0.000  0.559  0.005  0.001  0 
United  Kingdom  508.02 518.20 506.81 26,044  0.11  0.06  0.129  0.986  0.064  0.093  0 
United  States  483.49 491.59 494.87 34,875  0.29  0.06  0.020  0.928  0.142  0.182  0 
Country means, based on non-imputed data for each variable, weighted by sampling probabilities.  Socioeconomic status = PISA index of economic, social and 
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Notes: Added-variable plot of a regression of the share of PISA 2003 students enrolled in privately operated schools 
on Catholic population share in 1900 (interacted with an indicator whether Catholicism was the state religion) and 
all the control variables included in equation (2).  Based on a student-level regression (equivalent to the first column 
of Table 2) that is then aggregated to the country level.   
Table 1:  Least Squares Results 
OECD countries  Predominantly Christian countries
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







 (13.573)  (14.012)  (14.332)  (14.460) (15.372) (14.655) 
Catholic share in 2000  -  -5.592  -12.946  -  -6.641  -13.760 
 -  (13.283)  (12.468)  -  (13.942)  (13.186) 
Government funding share   -  -  34.580
** -  - 37.231
** 
   in private schools  - -  (13.948)  - -  (14.880) 
Observations  (students)  219,794 219,794 202,646 204,788 204,788 187,640 
Clustering units (countries)   29  29  27  26  26  24 
R
2    0.377 0.377 0.385 0.370 0.370 0.379 
Dependent variable: PISA 2003 math score.  Least squares regressions weighted by students’ sampling probability.  
All regressions control for: 15 student characteristics, 16 family background measures, 9 measures of school 
location and resources, GDP per capita, expenditure per student, external exit exams, Communist background, 
imputation dummies, and interaction terms between imputation dummies and the variables. “Predominantly 
Christian countries” refers to countries with a share of adherence to Christian denominations of more than 85 
percent in 1900.  Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level in parentheses.  Significance 
level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent, 
* 10 percent.  
Table 2:  Instrumental Variable Results: Math Achievement 
OECD countries  Predominantly Christian countries
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Second stage (Dependent variable: PISA 2003 math score): 







 (25.127)  (40.544)  (45.040)  (25.759) (41.136) (45.213) 
Catholic share in 2000  -  -28.311  -33.995
* - -28.409  -35.779
* 
 -  (20.492)  (17.471)  -  (21.122)  (17.986) 
Government funding share   -  -  8.427  -  -  13.404 
   in private schools  - -  (22.966)  - -  (22.614) 
First stage (Dependent variable: private school share): 







   (no state religion)  (0.130) (0.152) (0.118) (0.127) (0.146) (0.112) 
Catholic share in 2000  -  0.190
** 0.074  -  0.207  0.097 
 -  (0.075)  (0.076)  -  (0.071)  (0.070) 
Government funding share   -  -  0.297
*** -  - 0.283
*** 
   in private schools  - -  (0.085)  - -  (0.075) 
Observations  (students)  219,794 219,794 202,646 204,788 204,788 187,640 
Clustering units (countries)   29  29  27  26  26  24 
Instrument F-statistic  13.36 6.18 10.58  14.31 6.57 12.01 
R
2  (first  stage)  0.510 0.543 0.630 0.541 0.586 0.680 
R
2 (second stage)  0.373  0.366  0.368  0.366  0.361  0.364 
Two-stage least squares regressions weighted by students’ sampling probability.  All regressions control for: 15 
student characteristics, 16 family background measures, 9 measures of school location and resources, GDP per 
capita, expenditure per student, external exit exams, Communist background, imputation dummies, and interaction 
terms between imputation dummies and the variables. “Predominantly Christian countries” refers to countries with a 
share of adherence to Christian denominations of more than 85 percent in 1900. “Catholic share in 1900 (no state 
religion)” refers to the share of Catholics in the population in 1900 interacted with an indicator of whether 
Catholicism was the state religion.  Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level in parentheses.  
Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent, 
* 10 percent.  
  
Table 3:  Instrumental Variable Results: Science and Reading Achievement 
Science  Reading 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







 (20.511)  (34.762)  (34.978)  (17.238) (29.642) (32.964) 
Catholic share in 2000  -  -16.219  -16.600  -  -3.181  -6.717 
 -  (16.413)  (13.362)  -  (16.350)  (14.922) 
Government funding share   -  -  5.716  -  -  11.616 
   in private schools  - -  (19.184)  - -  (19.521) 
Observations  (students)  219,794 219,794 202,646 219,794 219,794 202,646 
Clustering units (countries)   29  29  27  29  29  27 
R
2 (second stage)  0.331  0.329  0.329  0.355  0.355  0.353 
Dependent variable: PISA 2003 science/reading score.  Sample: OECD countries.  Second stage of two-stage least 
squares regressions weighted by students’ sampling probability (see Table 2 for first-stage results).  All regressions 
control for: 15 student characteristics, 16 family background measures, 9 measures of school location and resources, 
GDP per capita, expenditure per student, external exit exams (using subject-specific data for science), Communist 
background, imputation dummies, and interaction terms between imputation dummies and the variables. “Catholic 
share in 1900 (no state religion)” refers to the share of Catholics in the population in 1900 interacted with an 
indicator of whether Catholicism was the state religion.  Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country 
level in parentheses.  Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent, 
* 10 percent.   
Table 4:  Robustness Analyses 










 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Second stage (Dependent variable: PISA 2003 math score): 






 (20.824)  (24.833)  (25.805) (24.469)  (24.419) 
First stage (Dependent variable: private school share): 






   (no state religion)  (0.113) (0.113)  (0.110) (0.117)  (0.129) 
Observations (students)  195,875  185,956  219,794  129,189  169,255 
Clustering units (countries)  25  27  29  22  28
a 
Instrument F-statistic 31.62  26.30  18.64  22.48  14.17 
R
2 (first stage)  0.597  0.585  0.656  0.675  0.520 
R
2 (second stage)  0.373  0.327  0.373  0.361  0.383 
Sample: OECD countries.  Two-stage least squares regressions weighted by students’ sampling probability.  All 
regressions control for: 15 student characteristics, 16 family background measures, 9 measures of school location 
and resources, GDP per capita, expenditure per student, external exit exams, Communist background, imputation 
dummies, and interaction terms between imputation dummies and the variables. “Catholic share in 1900 (no state 
religion)” refers to the share of Catholics in the population in 1900 interacted with an indicator of whether 
Catholicism was the state religion.  Region dummies used in column (3) include Europe, East Asia, North America, 
and Oceania. “Public school students only” drops all students enrolled in privately operated schools from the 
sample.  
a School-level information on private operation is not available for Australia.  Robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the country level in parentheses.  Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent, 
* 10 percent.  
Table 5:  Private School Competition and Expenditure per Student 
OECD countries  Predominantly Christian countries
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Second stage (Dependent variable: expenditure per student in 2003): 







 (15.031)  (23.329)  (23.388)  (13.635) (20.529) (19.528) 





 -  (6.135)  (5.904)  -  (5.820)  (5.608) 
Government funding share   -  -  9.071  -  -  8.060 
   in private schools  - -  (7.437)  - -  (6.004) 
First stage (Dependent variable: private school share): 







   (no state religion)  (0.128) (0.134) (0.104) (0.122) (0.128) (0.093) 
Catholic share in 2000  -  0.177
** 0.086  -  0.185
** 0.096 
 -  (0.075)  (0.074)  -  (0.080)  (0.074) 
Government funding share   -  -  0.301
*** -  - 0.312
*** 
   in private schools  - -  (0.092)  - -  (0.086) 
Observations  (students)  219,794 219,794 202,646 204,788 204,788 187,640 
Clustering units (countries)   29  29  27  26  26  24 
Instrument F-statistic  11.66 7.67 10.07  14.13 9.32 14.35 
R
2  (first  stage)  0.437 0.469 0.579 0.471 0.512 0.647 
R
2 (second stage)  0.902  0.879  0.874  0.906  0.896  0.896 
Two-stage least squares regressions weighted by students’ sampling probability.  All regressions control for: 15 
student characteristics, 16 family background measures, 4 measures of school location, GDP per capita, external exit 
exams, Communist background, imputation dummies, and interaction terms between imputation dummies and the 
variables. “Predominantly Christian countries” refers to countries with a share of adherence to Christian 
denominations of more than 85 percent in 1900. “Catholic share in 1900 (no state religion)” refers to the share of 
Catholics in the population in 1900 interacted with an indicator of whether Catholicism was the state religion.  
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level in parentheses.  Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 
5 percent, 
* 10 percent.  